Legitimacy Versus Legality - English Essay

Legitimacy Versus Legality

English Essay on "Legitimacy Versus Legality"

If one assumes that President Pervez Musharraf sought legitimation from the referendum, then it has proven an abject failure; but if one assumes, as is more likely, that his primary object was legality, then it has been a resounding success. Ayub Khan was the only military ruler of Pakistan who sought popularity as well as real power. Neither Yahya nor Zia made any such attempt, and it seems that Musharraf may have gone through the motions, but that was not his real purpose.

His claims of the people having spoken, and of the looters and plunderers being rejected, therefore, should perhaps be taken in the same spirit as his routine declarations of love for the poor people of Pakistan., and Ziaul Haq’s famous televised tears while presenting the 1988 caretaker budget. If he really believes that the people of Pakistan have voted for him in the numbers declared by the. Election Commission, then, however, he is in trouble.

So long as he remains realistic, he will be safe, because his decision-making will be based on facts, and move towards achievable objectives. If, on the other hand, he falls victim to his own media managers propaganda, then he is in trouble, for then he will be basing his decisions on fantasies about his own popularity, and the loyalty and efficiency of his allies. He would do well to remember the philosophy of the Roman Emperor Tiberius, who ruled with an iron hand, and who terrorized the political elite of Rome: “I don’t care if they the people of RomeI hate me, so long as they obey me.” His nephew Germanics was immensely popular with the people, and died mysteriously of poison, a fate which struck a lot of people in Tiberius’ era. Germanicus’ son Caligula, and Tiberius’ great-nephew, was the childless Emperor’s heir.educationsight.blogspot.com He was as popular as his father, and as cruel and ruthless as his great-uncle, but he desired to be loved by the people. His methods, such as free bread distributions and an endless round of ever more elaborate gladiatorial shows, bankrupted the Treasury, which Tiberius had husbanded carefully, building on the surpluses left by the great Augustus. In the end, Caligula’s frustration emerged when he said, “I wish they [the people of Rome] had one neck, so that I could cut it off with one stroke.”

Tiberius was a realist, who knew he could not win the love of the people, so he did not bother trying. Caligula, on the other hand, fell victim to his own need to be loved. The accounts of his actions towards the end of his reign indicate that he may not have gone completely mad, but would certainly have benefited from modern psychiatric treatment.

Similarly, if Musharraf does not bother with the legitimacy issue, the way is clear for him to continue ruling, even if the people remain ungrateful for the way he prevented Pakistan from being destroyed after September 11, the stabilization of the balance of payments, including therein the huge debt rescheduling and the accumulation of unprecedented foreign exchange reserves. However, he should keep in mind that this is counterbalanced by cumulative rises since he took over of fuel, power and gas prices, accompanied by stagnating growth, shrinking real incomes (despite record low inflation) and lack of employment opportunities. His reforms (which consist of slavishly toeing the IMF’ line) were hailed as bold because they courted public unpopularity. Precisely because they were bold, they could not be popular. No one loves dentists, even though they relieve suffering, because they still cause pain. And a dentist who extracts the wrong tooth, as many Pakistanis feel Musharraf has done, is even more unpopular.

Yet there is no groundswell of opposition. At best, if the opposition parties are to gain any momentum, t will be to improve their electoral chances in October, rather than to enable them to launch a street agitation so strong that it might topple the government. The main reactor working in Musharraf’s favor is the low inflation rate, which allows people to adjust gradually to their slow impoverishment, rather than galloping rises in prices which’ erode the value of stagnating income in quantum leaps. Also, now that lie has obtained a five-year term, the opposition will enter Parliament facing him as a strong President, having been elected under rules of his making, under a dispensation of his design.

However, the President should not have any misconceptions about the election results. Of the King’s parties, Farooq Leghari, Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri had not shown any ability, so their inability to muster the vote for the referendum was understandable. However, the PML(Q) was a massive disappointment. While the heat of constituency politics will generate more interest, the abysmal turnout indicated clearly the King’s parties’ true level of following among the people. (Or simply that potential PML(Q) candidates were not willing to fritter away funds earmarked for their own October campaigns.) It also showed that the nazims were not yet effective political forces, and while they may still have a significant impact on the October elections, they are not going to be the kingmakers they were once expected ‘to be, at least not this time. The electoral advantage of both these developments go to the opposition parties, which are also the parties without nazims. Musharraf now has three choices: he can postpone the October elections, rig them, orgo with the flow. Postponement is the safest, if the President has confidence that his economic policies will soon yield dividends and improve his popularity. However, there will be the problem of getting around the Supreme Court mandate, recently renewed in the referendum case, and while the internatic.nal community will wallow this departure from the roadmap, the European Union will not overlook it, and the US will ‘e embarrassed at its new-found friend turning, into another tinpot military dictator. And of course, the economic policies right be plain wrong, and worsen the recession instead of improving it.

If he rigs the elections, he runs the risk of causing popular revulsion to the point where governing becomes difficult. Also, how much rigging is possible, if your candidates are already losers? The last election in which there was some relatively open systematic government-sponsored rigging was 1977, where the rigging party already enjoyed a huge votebank. (Allegations about other elections involve so-called ‘scientific’ rigging’, are backed by Ii We evidence except turnout patterns and statistical anomalies.) It is possible to convert a narrow loser by 2000 votes into a narrow winner by 500 with some effort. It is possible, by brute force arid open rigging, to convert one or two losers by 20,000 votes into winners by 60,000. But it is not possible to convert 150 big losers into winners, not even if the whole Army was deployed on this duty. Even if done, it would cause too much of an international and domestic stink, and destroy the credibility of such a Parliament.

The President should remember that his legitimacy flows, as Mao said, out of the barrel of a gun, and thus the lack of credibility of the referendum will not affect his position. However, elected representatives depend for legitimacy on the general acceptance that they were reasonably fairly elected. ‘Reasonably fair’ is important: George Bush’s acceptability as US President is not because of a Supreme Court ruling, or because he ‘won’ in. Florida, but because he had won 258 electoral votes fair and square, and even in Florida, he would have lost by as narrow a margin as he won by. It would have been different had he had the results reversed in 10 states, and he had been losing in Florida by a huge margin. Any democratic edifice constructed on large scale rigging is inherently wobbly.

The wisest course, though the least appealing and requiring the most delicate handling, is to go with the flow. This involves supporting the King’s parties as much as possible, short of actual rigging, and preparing for a Parliament dominated by opposition parties, probably the PPP. Musharraf’s referendum rhetoric may come back haunt him, but it should be possible to remain in control of such a situation, provided the President stops expecting the Cabinet to be glorified office boys, and is willing to give them leeway in managing the country, including undoing some aspects of his reforms. He should also accept that he will have only one presidential term, and not try to wangle a second, for that itself would prove destabilizing.

It would also be advisable, therefore, in the context of cohabitation with a hostile government, for Musharraf to minimise the constitutional amendments he intends. The temptation to shift the balance of power to himself is obvious, because he might think it would strengthen him against a hostile Parliament. However, the flip ‘side is that by strengthening himself, he increases resistance. If faced with a hostile Cabinet, a clever move would be to divest himself of the office of COAS. With minimal amendments, and holding a purely constitutional position, he will paradoxically strengthen himself in playing a moderating and guiding role, avoid too much attention being paid to the referendum voting, and may do a better job of preserving the substance of his reforms than if he attempts to rule with an iron hand. However, for that he will have to overcome I psychological reality that his predecessors could not: it is very difficult to shed the habits of absolute power.

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